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IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. MECHAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs . 
GAIL T. MECHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14084 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce wherein Plaintiff-
Respondent, hereinafter "plaintiff,ff averred mental cruelty 
as grounds and sought custody of the parties1 minor child. 
Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter "defendant,f! counter-claimed 
for divorce upon grounds of mental cruelty, for custody of the 
parties1 minor child, alimony, child support, and for division 
of the parties' personal property in accordance with the 
stipulation of the parties dated June 4, 1974. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff and defendant a 
decree of divorce one from the other on the grounds of mental 
cruelty; awarded custody of the minor child to plaintiff 
subject to review after the expiration of one year from 
date of entry of the decree, and awarded defendant one dollar 
a year alimony. Defendant's Alternative Motion for New 
Trial or Amendment of the Decree was denied April 15, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the lower court's 
award of custody to plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence adduced at trial November 29, 1974y 
December 2, 3, and 4, 1974, and March 14, 1975, records: 
The parties were married November 7, 1970. (Tr. 
10, 222, 227) One child named Andrew, three years of age, 
(now four) was born of the marriage on April 26, 1971. 
(Tr. 10, 11, 227) 
When the parties were married plaintiff was 
employed as an attorney having been admitted to practice 
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in this state in May, 1967. (Tr. 10, 130) During the 
majority of the courtship period, defendant was employed 
as a stewardess but terminated her employment prior to 
marriage* (Tr. 9) After the parties' separation on May 24, 
1974, defendant obtained employment with Mountain Bell 
Telephone Company as a service representative trainee on 
July 8, 1974, but according to defendant's witness, Ona Hunt, 
^he was transferred to "conversion-type work11 because 
11
. • .she had trouble holding up under the pressure, . .fl of 
a service representative trainee. (Tr. 10, 150) According 
to defendant's counsel, defendant terminated her employment 
with Mountain Bell on March 11, 1975, in anticipation of 
remarriage. (Tr. 339) 
Defendant has exhibited conduct of an irrational, 
unstable, self-destructive, and emotional nature. Approxi-
mately one year before the parties were married she attempted 
to take her life through the ingestion of an overdose of 
aspirin, for which she was hospitalized overnight at the 
Latter-Day Saints Hospital. (Tr. 12, 141, 142) 
Defendant cited plaintiff's misrepresentations 
about the latter's marital status prior to marriage 
and drinking as factors precipitative of the attempt 
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upon her life. (Tr. 223, 225) She testified of being aware 
in January, 1970, (New Year's Day) that no action had been 
taken by plaintiff to obtain a divorce. (Tr. 223, 224) 
Plaintiff testified the decree of divorce from his first 
wife was granted June 23, 1970, and became final October 23, 
1970. (Tr. 200, 201) 
For three months after the birth of the parties1 
.child, defendant testified she suffered severe depression 
caused by the death of her grandmother, hormonal changes, 
and the plaintiff's drinking. (Tr. 19) She received 
psychiatric care for her depression. (Tr. 19) Defendant 
stated she entertains ". . .feelings of insecurity," 
caused by her background and her relationship with the 
plaintiff (Tr. 21, 22), that she is prone to fits of rage 
and irrational conduct evidenced by throwing objects, biting, 
and beating (Tr. 20, 268, 270), breaking furniture and 
dishes (Tr. 270), and using abusive language• (Tr. 179) 
She also stated that the use of alcohol causes her to lose 
proper perspective and abandon responsibilities as witnessed 
by automobile accidents (Tr. 296, 297), refusal to leave 
social functions at reasonable hours, (Tr. 300-302), "skinny 
dipping" (Tr. 300), and loss of consciousness. (Tr. 296) 
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On August 6, 1974, defendant again attempted to 
take her life in the presence of plaintiff and the minor 
child after the child stated: ?fNo, I want to stay with you, 
Daddy.11 (Tr. 140) On that occasion, she administered a 
potentially lethal overdose of Valium for which she was 
hospitalized at the University Hospital until the afternoon 
of the following day. (Tr. 140, 181) Plaintiff testified he 
$nd his son drove to the defendant's apartment after a birth-
day celebration to return the child to defendant at about 
8:45 p.m., on the evening of August 6, 1974, that defendant 
was not at her apartment, that plaintiff then drove to the 
location of one Michael W. Turpin's apartment with whom 
defendant had been romantically involved since May 3, 1974, 
that a discussion ensued between the defendant and the child 
out of earshot of the plaintiff in which the child apparently 
indicated he wanted to stay with his father, that defendant 
became emotional and distraught whereupon she stated, "You 
poisoned your son's mind against me,11 (Tr. 139), that 
defendant, upon arrival at her apartment, announced in the 
presence of her son. . . "Okay, Ifm going to call my attorney 
and you can have Andrew, (Tr. 140), all I want to do is get 
this thing ended. . .," that defendant who admitted she had 
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consumed "several drinks and I just lost control,!! (Tr. 126), 
thereafter administered an overdose of Valium, which caused 
loss of consciousness. (Tr. 138-141) Plaintiff and the 
child rushed her to the University Hospital. (Tr. 138-141) 
Besides the immediate events of August 6, 1974, defendant 
and her counsel cited events which occurred in May and June, 
1974, as being factors which contributed to her second 
-attempted suicide. (Tr. 126, 250-252) 
On May 3, 1974, while the plaintiff and defendant 
were living together as husband and wife, defendant met 
Michael Wo Turpin with whom she became immediately romanti-
cally and sexually involved. (Tr. 24-26) Defendant testified 
she spent the Memorial Day weekend between May 24 and May 27, 
1974, with Mr. Turpin at his cabin located at Holliday Park, 
Utah, wherein she engaged in illicit sexual relations believ-
ing plaintiff and the minor child to be in St. George, Utah, 
with plaintiff's parents. (Tr. 27, 28) Although defendant 
denied to plaintiff any extramarital involvement with 
Mr. Turpin or anyone else prior to her sojourn in Holliday 
Park (Tr. 130, 131, 132), she admitted at trial that she and 
Mr. Turpin had intimate sexual contact on several occasions 
between May 13th and 17th, 1974. (Tr. 25, 26) Additionally, 
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defendant testified as to a night spent with the husband 
of a "friend11 while the latter's wife was out of town a 
year before the parties1 separation; although any impropriety 
on her part was denied. (Tr. 118, 119) 
Both parties expressed their love and affection 
for the minor child. (Tr. 28, 30, 144) Defendant testified 
that the child ". . .was very close to his father, he loved 
his father, too. . .", that she felt plaintiff lf. . .was a 
good father to Andrew. . .", and that ". . . he (Andrew) is 
possibly the only human being that George has ever loved.!f 
(Tr. 141) Defendant's witnesses who were acquainted with 
the plaintiff and had observed him with the child both before 
and after the parties' separation, described the relationship 
between plaintiff and the minor child as "congenial" and 
"very loving." (Tr. 193, 198) 
Between June and August defendant left the child 
in the care of babysitters on many occasions to be with 
Mr. Turpin. (Tr. 37-42) Frequently she did not return to 
the child on such occasions until early morning. (Tr. 37-42) 
Defendant, on the evening of June 6, 1974, aroused the child 
from his bed at approximately 10 o'clock p.m., packed him 
in her car, and traveled to Mr. Turpin's cabin arriving 
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around midnight, whereupon she spent the night. (Tr. 34, 
35) She also testified that having the child under her 
care would have interferred with her sexual, but not 
romantic, involvement with Mr. Turpin. (Tr. 32). 
Plaintiff testified that the child lived with him 
after August 6, 1974, until the time of trial (Tr. 135), 
that he enrolled the child in nursery school two mornings 
a week (Tuesday and Thursday) as planned prior to separation 
(Tr. 144), that plaintiff's mother cared for the child during 
hours he spent at work after which he cared for the child, 
(Tr. 144), that in the four months prior to trial he had 
left the child with a babysitter on only one occasion (Tr. 146), 
that he envisioned his role as a parent as that of "provider," 
"teacher,11 and "friend," and that he felt he was performing 
these roles adequately for the child. (Tr. 143) 
Defendant also testified she had no family or 
relatives living in Utah. (Tr. 9) 
ISSUES 
The exclusive issue for determination by this Court 
is whether the lower court abused its discretion or acted 





THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the 
welfare and best interests of minor children constitutes 
the primary concern and guiding principle in the award of 
children caught in the turbulance of divorce. 
This Court in Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 
202 P. 2d 550 (1949), declared: 
"Child custody proceedings are equitable 
in the highest decree, and this court has 
consistently held that the best interests 
and welfare of the minor child is the 
controlling factor in every case.11 
The declaration of Sampsell supra, has been oft 
repeated as being of paramount importance. Steiger v. 
Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956); Johnson v. 
Johnson; 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16 (1958); Hyde v. Hyde, 
22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969); Arends v. Arends, 
30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P. 2d 1019 (1974) . 
It is no less settled that the trial courtfs 
decision as to child custody will not be disturbed unless 
it is clear that a breach of discretion occurred at the lower 
level. Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931 
(1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198, 389 P. 2d 1023 
(1964). The reason given for the "infallibility" rule is 
that the trial court is in an advantaged position to observe 
the demeanor of the witnesses and form opinions. As stated 
in Sampsell supra, at 115 Utah 80: 
"The trial judge had the opportunity, as we 
do not, of seeing the parties and the witnesses, 
of observing their demeanor, and of forming 
opinions." 
Perhaps more apposite to the case at bar is the 
court fs statement in Hyde supra,, where in it states at 454 P. 
2d 885: 
"The trial lasted several days, and since 
both parties testified in open court and 
were present during the taking of the 
testimony of other witnesses, the trial 
judge was in a much better position to 
determine the question of fitness of the 
parties to have custody than are we who 
are limited to the reading of the record. 
He had the advantage of observing the 
behavior of the parties and could, therefore, 
better judge the emotional stability of each, 
than we can." 
A. A FINDING OF UNFITNESS OF THE MOTHER IS NOT NECESSARY 
TO SUSTAIN AN AWARD OF CUSTODY IN THE FATHER. 
In the case of Walton v. Koffman et ux., 110 Utah 1, 
169 P. 2d 97 (1946), which involved a custody contest: between 
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the mother of the children and the childrenfs grandparents 
this court reversed an award of custody of the plaintiff 
(mother) even though it found the plaintiff morally fit and 
able to support them. 
The court in Sampsell supra, in affirmance of an 
award of partial custody to the father upon a finding that 
it was in the best interest of the child held that plaintiff 
^as not entitled, as a matter of law to custody of a minor 
child under Section 40-3-10, U.C.A. (1943), merely because 
there was no showing that she was an improper person. 
More recently in Hyde supra, this court sustained 
the award of a two-year-old minor daughter to her father des-
pite insistance by the defendant that a mother's right to 
custody of small children should not be denied, unless it 
is shown ff. . .that she is such an immoral, incompetent, or 
otherwise improper person that it would be contrary to the 
child's best interests. . .,f to award her custody. The 
court looked to evidence of the defendant's emotional condition 
as justification for the trial court's belief that the 
condition of the defendant could deteriorate under stress 
and strain, even though it did not find her an unfit or 
improper person. (Emphasis added.) 
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Also, in the case of Lantis v. Lantis, 86 Nev. 885, 
478 P. 2d 163 (1970), which involved an appeal from an order 
changing custody from the mother to the father, the Nevada 
Supreme Court held it unnecessary for the mother to be found 
unfit to justify a change of custody previously awarded. 
The Nevada court recited the concern of the lower court at 
478 P. 2d 165: 
..4 ."I think the big issue that confronts us 
here is not so much whether Debbie Lantis is 
fit and proper and a decent person and so 
forth, but rather whether she is mature enough 
and responsible enough to undertake all of 
the duties of the mother and take care of this 
little girl. Frankly that's the way I see it, 
and this is what makes it hard. * * * I don't 
think Debbie is a terrible person by any 
means. I don't approve of some of her conduct. 
I'm old-fashioned, too, and I don't approve 
of it for one minute. The conduct itself 
doesn't necessarily in my opinion mak£ her 
unfit, unsuitable, or anything else, but it 
does indicate something to me, and it indicates 
a lack of responsibility toward this little 
girl.* * *" 
The evidence now before this court clearly demon-
strates the immature and unstable nature of the defendant. 
She has attempted suicide on two different occasions for 
which she was hospitalized and she suffered from severe 
depression after the birth of the minor child for a period 
of three months, (Tr. 12, 19, 21, 22, 140) 
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Defendant attempted to show that her inclination 
towards self-destruction before the parties were married in 
November, 1970, was provoked, and perhaps even justified, 
by plaintiff's misrepresentations concerning his marital 
status and by the use of alcohol during their courtship. 
(Tr. 223, 225) Yet, it appears from defendant's own testimony 
that the events claimed as precipitious of the first suicide 
^occurred several months after the suicide attempt. She 
testified she met with the plaintiff and his former wife 
on New Year's Day 1970, and shortly thereafter, learned 
divorce proceedings by the plaintiff's former wife had not 
been commenced. (Tr. 224) She further testified to the best 
of her recollection that the first attempted suicide occurred 
a year before marriage. If such is the case, it would have 
occurred in October or November, 1969; months before the 
complained events. One can only speculate why defendant 
consented to marry plaintiff if their pre-marital association 
was so unsettled and excruciatingly painful as to cause 
defendant to attempt suicide. 
Dr. Tedrow testified many reasons exist in expla-
nation of suicide, but that usually people who are not crazy 
or schizophrenic, who attempt suicide, are of a depressive 
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nature. (Tr. 91) Such persons, he stated, are usually 
wholly dependent upon other persons, (Tr. 91) 
Dr. Tedrow's characterization of the depressive 
as being dependent upon other persons tends in some measure 
to explain why the defendant became so totally involved 
with Mr. Turpin after their May meeting. 
Defendant and her counsel cited the stress and 
strain of the events of May 27 through June 3, 1974, as the 
cause of defendant's second suicide attempt in August. 
(Tr. 102) Dr. Tedrow on redirect examination testified, 
however, that a casual connection between stress and strain 
occuring two months before the actual attempt did not stack 
up very well. (Tr. 113) Cause and effect is usually a matter 
of hours or a few days, he stated. (Tr. 114) 
The more logical explanation for the second suicide 
seems to be that when the minor child verbalized a preference 
for the plaintiff, the defendant felt totally rejected 
by the child and that all was lost. (Tr. 140) 
While Dr. Nielson testified that in his opinion 
the defendant's suicide gestures would not detract from her 
ability to meet the minor child's needs (Tr. 52), Dr. Ferre 
expressed some concern about how the defendant had coped with 
-14- ' 
stress and difficult situations in the past. (Tr. 332) 
He indicated he could not predict with any certainty what 
her capacity to deal with stress and difficult situations 
would hold in the future. (Tr. 332) He also testified 
that defendant's deep involvement with Mr. Turpin showed 
poor judgment in his opinion. (Tr. 332) 
Defendant urges reversal by this court based upon 
.the conclusions of Drs. Nielson and Ferre that defendant is 
the "psychological-" parent. Yet, both doctors testified that 
in their view plaintiff was a fit parent; and able to fulfill 
the needs of the minor child. (Tr. 51, 333) Both testified 
the child was remarkably free from symptoms usually found in 
a child whose parents were separated. (Tr. 51, 60, 330, 328) 
Dr. Ferre further testified he felt the plaintiff's mother 
(child's grandmother) had a ". . .good relationship with the 
boy. . .," that she was providing adequately for him, and 
seemed very concerned. (Tr. 329) Nor did Dr. Ferre see 
any problems related to the plaintiff's mother caring for the 
minor child during the day. (Tr. 330) 
At the conclusion of the trial the court expressed 
grave concern that neither Dr. Nielson nor Ferre had dealt 
at any length with the manifest emotional instability of the 
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defendant witnessed by periods of "depression and the 
association with Mr. Turpin." 
ffYes, I read this and he finally said there 
is some -- the report here, I am most concerned 
for the child. Very frankly most concerned. 
The reasons were explained, yes, about Mrs. 
Mecham!s emotional problems which resulted in 
some attempts at self-destruction, whether 
they were successful or not, nobody has said 
much about these in this reports and I am very 
distressed. And by distressed not at her, what 
gives me problems in this is the emotional 
A /instability, the fact that during this matter 
her association with Mr. Turpin under the 
circumstances caused me substantial questions 
in this matter/' (Tr. 338, 339) 
If it is in error for the trial court to refuse to 
substitute the judgment of medical experts for its own 
informed judgment, after hearing the evidence and observing 
the demeanor of the parties, then, perhaps, it is time that 
decisions concerning the welfare and placement of children 
in divorce actions be removed from the area of judicial 
determination. 
B. PLAINTIFF HAS EXHIBITED LOVE AND AFFECTION FOR THE MINOR 
CHILD, WILL HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS WHO LOVE AND CARE 
FOR THE CHILD TO ASSIST IN THE CARE OF THE CHILD, AND MAINTAINS 
THE CONTINUITY OF PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL CONTACTS AND ENVIRONMENT 
SO VITAL TO A CHILD'S WELFARE 
-16-
The lower court determined both parties were fit 
and proper parents. (Tr. 344) But, upon balance, it 
found plaintiff could more adequately meet the child's 
needs. Defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof 
imposed by the parties' stipulation on each party; that is, 
f!which party can best care for the interests and welfare 
of said child." (R. 20) 
The award of custody to plaintiff based upon the 
interests and welfare of the child is substantiated by the 
record. Plaintiff testified he provided for the child's 
physical and emotional needs and otherwise performed functions 
normally characterized as maternal. (Tr. 142, 143) Defendant 
also witnessed the performance of "fatherly11 functions by 
plaintiff. (Tr. 270) No testimony was introduced to 
contradict plaintiff's conclusion that the minor child was 
receiving a balance of maternal and paternal attentions 
equivalent to those received prior to the parties' separation. 
No evidence was introduced to show plaintiff's 
care of the child was other than proper, or that the child 
was adversely affected by being in plaintiff's care. While 
Drs . Nielson and Ferre agreed that defendant was the 
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"Psychological" parent and therefore, preferable 
(Tr. 52, 334), both agreed plaintiff was a fit parent 
capable of adequately meeting the child's needs. (Tr. 51, 
330) Both were impressed by the child's remarkable freedom 
from symptoms normally associated with marital difficulties 
and with the child's above-average adjustment to his new 
situation. (Tr. 51, 330) 
.* •.-.'-.  /While Dr. Ferre expressed concern over what he 
characterized as the "vindictiveness and hostility" of the 
plaintiff toward the defendant, he stated that he could find 
no evidence that the child was being affected by such 
sentiments. (Tr. 328) To the contrary, he concluded the 
child had made an unusually fine adjustment. (Tr. 330) 
Dr. Tedrow found plaintiff possessed of qualities befitting 
a good parent. (Tr. 90) 
With regard to the ability of which party could 
best provide for the care of the child, evidence established 
that since the separation, the welfare of the child has 
been plaintiff's paramount concern. The child was enrolled 
in the same pre-school nursery as contemplated by the 
parties before separation. (Tr. 144) This, as opposed to 
defendant's withdrawal of the child's application from 
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the school because her employment schedule precluded time 
off to deliver or pick up the child. (Tr. 18) Dr. Nielson 
believed the nursery school was the most stable environment 
in the childfs life at the time of his evaluation, and that 
it should be preserved at all cost. (Tr. 72) 
Additionally, plaintiff spent his time during the 
evenings, weekends and holidays exclusively with the child, 
save one evening outing to a football game. (Tr. 146) 
In contrast, during the two months defendant had the care of 
the child, he was often left with babysitters until the early 
hours of the morning (Tr. 34, 37-42), on one occasion aroused 
him from his sleep at approximately 10:00 p.m., so that she 
could spend the weekend with Mr. Turpin at the latter !s 
cabin (Tr. 34), and defendant manifested such poor judgment 
and lack of concern for the child's sensibilities as to 
attempt to take her life in the presence of the child. 
(Tr. 30, 139, 140, 256) The impact of that night still 
lingers. 
It is significant defendant made no attempt to 
gain custody of the child during the four months prior to 
trial. Her desire to not make a "football" out of the child, 
(Tr. 257), while laudible, contravenes a more apparent 
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reason. Defendant testified that Mr. Turpin slept at 
her apartment when the child was not present and that while 
custody of the child would not have interferred with her 
romantic involvement, it would have interferred with her 
sexual involvement with Mr. Turpin. (Tr. 32) 
Both Drs. Nielson and Ferre expressed the 
importance of stability and consistency in the child's life. 
(Tr. 66, .336) Custody in the plaintiff provides such 
stability and consistency. The child lives in the home 
where he has lived since infancy. (Tr . 136) He maintains 
friendships with neighborhood children with whom* he is 
comfortable and familiar. (Tr. 145) He attends church. 
He has a daily lifestyle similar to that enjoyed before the 
parties' separation. In most instances, the child follows 
the same secure patterns of life established for him before 
May, 1974, which have enabled him to adjust to a potentially 
chaotic situation with remarkable ease. 
Dr. Nielson testified that a child often reflects 
the attitudes, prejudices and vices of a parent. (Tr. 73) 
flI think the relationship that a child has with his parents 
will have a lot to do with how he relates to his own 
children,ff the doctor stated. (Tr. 84) Defendant admitted 
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she shelters feelings of insecurity fostered by her child-
hood experiences, (Tr. 21, 22) Defendant's insecurity is 
a problem for real concern as witnessed by prolonged depression 
after the birth of the parties' child (Tr. 19), and two 
attempted suicides (Tr • 12, 140) which Dr. Tedrow stated 
were demonstrative of "the ultimate in depression/' (Tr. 91) 
No evidence was adduced to demonstrate that the plaintiff 
,1s insecure or is subject to periods of emotional instability. 
While defendant cites the use of alcohol, foul 
language, and misrepresentations as evidence of the plaintiff's 
instability, the record bespeaks defendant's use of alcohol, 
foul language, violence and misrepresentations, if such is 
the measure, of emotional instability. Given plaintiff's 
imperfections, no evidence was produced to show any actual 
or imagined detriment to the child as a result of plaintiff's 
actions. Dr. Ferre testified that plaintiff's solutions, 
while perhaps not the best solutions, "showed he was an 
intelligent and refined person.11 (Tr. 331) On the other 
hand, the defendant's attempted suicide in the presence of 
the parties1 minor child undoubtedly has been indelibly 
impressed upon the child. 
Both parties admittedly are concerned for the 
-21-
welfare of the child. Both parties love the child. But 
. i 
beyond that is the question as to which party can best 
i 
provide for the child's needs. Defendant offers love and I 
care (Tr. 28), while plaintiff offers that together with I 
the realization that responsibilities are incumbent upon a 
i 
parent. Plaintiff recognizes that he must provide, teach, I 
befriend, and discipline the child. (Tr. 143) In this I 
regard, plaintiff is assisted during the hours he is employed 
by the child's paternal grandmother. B 
In the case at bar the lower court penalized I 
neither party. It found both parties fit and proper. -
(Tr. 344) It expressed concern about the emotional instability 
of the defendant and concern too, about her judgment. It's I 
concern was justified as evidenced by an attempted suicide | 
before marriage, a period of three months despondency following 
the child's birth, another attempted suicide in the presence | 
of the child, inability to cope with stress and strain in an • 
employment situation, and a relationship with Mr. Turpin 





It is respectfully submitted that the child custody 
award of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Placement of the child with the plaintiff has had 
the least detrimental effect upon the child. The child 
lives both in a physical and social environment where he 
feels comfortable and secure. The environment he has known 
since infancy. 
Plaintiff has shown himself to be responsible and 
more than capable of caring for the child's wants and needs. 
The child has made a better than average adjustment to his 
new situation. He enjoys a sense of permanency, a sense 
fostered by his having been with the plaintiff for more than 
a year now, a sense which should never again be disrupted. 
•SaTTTake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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